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Abstract
This paper develops an imitation-innovation model with heterogeneous labour and
foreign MNCs to examine industrial transformation for a developing host economy.
With FDI modelled at the disaggregated level of foreign experts, we formalise a MNC
composition-determination framework that explains Dunnings internalisation advan-
tage(from his renowned Eclectic Paradigm) as being driven by the presence of asym-
metric views on productivity of domestic workers. As the skills acquisition decision
and foreign subsidiariesoperational mode choice are determined along the same abil-
ity distribution in the model, policy complementarities between human capital and
FDI-promoting policies are established using calibrated analysis. Further, an addi-
tional asymmetry between Vertical MNCs and other MNCs leads to policy dynamics
that favour balanced, broad-based FDI-promoting policies over those disproportionate
ones biased towards selected types of foreign rms. Also, the policy complementarities
uncovered are stronger with endogenous technological change.
JEL Classication Numbers: F23, O14, O33, O41.
Keywords: Foreign Experts, Human Capital, Industrial Transformation, Innova-
tion.
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1 Introduction
Ever since Saggi (2002) documented the scarcity of studies modelling relative importance of
the di¤erent types of FDI in the industrial transformation process of developing economies,
this remains an under-studied area in the growth literature. On industrial transformation,
recent studies such as Agénor and Dinh (2013) and Agénor and Alpaslan (2014) developed
a growth framework with heterogeneous labour to examine the non-linear transitional dy-
namics associated with industrial transformation in a developing economy. However, they
do not account for the role of foreign multinationals (MNCs), which play a signicant role
in the East Asian development experience [Nelson and Pack 1999; Amsden 2001].
In terms of MNCsrole in developing economies, while literature surveys such as Faeth
(2009) indicate that the FDI phenomenon is largely a tale of heterogeneity, the most promi-
nent theory on MNCsmotives remains Dunnings Eclectic Paradigm (1977). He introduces
the Ownership-Location-Internalisation advantages (OLI) framework to explain the interna-
tional activities of MNCs as being driven by ownership-specic, location-specic, and inter-
nalisation advantages. In essence, the OLI framework links the strength of the rms, be it
in physical or human capital endowments, to location-specic factors of a host economy in
inuencing the internalisation decisions made. While the OLI framework is static, it suggests
that there appears to be sequential entry dynamics for foreign subsidiaries with regards to
the operational mode chosen for their activities in a host economy. Of the three main deter-
minants posited by Dunning, the ownership-specic and location-specic advantages have
been well-incorporated in many theoretical contributions [Faeth 2009], but there remains a
vacuum for theoretical explanation of internalisation advantages. Further, the internalisation
decisions within MNCs with respect to establishing foreign subsidiaries are often inuenced
by various micro-mechanisms tied to the incentives of foreign experts.
Given that a foreign expert-based, stylised internalisation advantage framework for
FDI is not an angle explored in the literature, this paper examines industrial transfor-
mation for a developing host economy by developing an imitation-innovation model with
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heterogeneous labour and a stylised heterogeneous MNC composition-determination frame-
work, where MNC is modelled in the disaggregated form of foreign experts, as suggested
by Markusen and Tromenko (2009). In the model, the MNC composition-determination
framework explains Dunnings internalisation advantage(1977) as being driven by the pres-
ence of asymmetric views on productivity of domestic workers. Specically, foreign experts
perceive heterogeneity among the productivity of domestic workers. As productivity is a
transformation of ability, the skills acquisition decision and foreign subsidiariesoperational
mode choice are linked along the same ability distribution in the host economy. This allows
for the examination of transitional dynamics of human capital and FDI-promoting policies,
so to uncover policy complementarities when a mixture of these policies are used. Further,
consistent with some well-documented stylised facts in the FDI literature, an additional
asymmetry between Vertical MNCs and other MNCs is also modelled. This then enables us
to lend some insights into the conventional debate on how best to implement FDI-promoting
policies in developing economies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Given the scarcity of literature and the
inherent di¢ culties in the modelling of the di¤erent types of MNCs in a developing host
economy, Section 2 provides a brief discussion on the rationale of the modelling approach for
the FDI-composition framework, guided by the FDI literature on the various policy issues
that the model attempts to address. Section 3 presents an overview of the model. Model
calibrations are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, the various policy experiments analysed
are reviewed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 FDI heterogeneity in developing host economy
To guide the construction of a FDI-composition framework for such an inherently hetero-
geneous phenomenon, we rst establish a hierarchy of internalisation decision-making with
regards to MNC mode, and the order of Nonmandated-Horizontal-Vertical matches their
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respective importance in the host economys spillover. Consistent with Dunning, rms are
said to opt for Horizontal over Vertical mode as the initial form of entry due to know-how
advantage over rivals, and the latter tends to be more costly too [Markusen 1995; Horstmann
and Markusen 1996]. However, due to factors such as agency or information cost, MNCs
tend to rst establish basic nonmandated subsidiaries as default entry mode [Saggi 2002],
which does not seem to play much of a role in driving industrial development, save for the
poorest low-income economies deprived of basic industrial structures.1
After that, both Horizontal and Vertical MNCs tend to invest in knowledge-intensive
industries and therefore prefer host economies with human capital [Borensztein et al. 1998].
However, given that the costs incurred by not getting access to high quality human capital is
much lower for horizontal operations, foreign rms would more likely opt for the Horizontal
FDI mode. Indeed, foreign subsidiaries are only inclined to send in foreign experts with
sophisticated innovation know-how if the pool of human capital of a host economy is highly
productive [Gersbach and Schmutzler 2011]. This implies that the top foreign experts coming
in via Vertical MNCs are likely to have an additional layer of preference to distinguish the
brightest of the most skilled workers.2
For a developing host economy with some stocks of human capital, a Horizontal MNC
is likely to benet the imitation activities, while a Vertical MNC would benet innovation.
Furthermore, a mixture of policies is often needed in the context of middle-income economies
as they often do not have the appropriate policy combination to improve technology transfer,
absorption capacity, and di¤usion [Agénor 2015]. There appears to be indirect, nonlinear
1The various FDI-targeting rules and ownership stipulations imposed in developing economies often in-
advertently result in many nonmandated subsidiaries of MNCs, in forms such as technological licensing
agreements and minority stakes in joint-ventures [Saggi 2002]. As MNCs often treat such commitments
as nonmandated subsidiaries internally, these result in MNCs that are neither imitation- nor innovation-
enhancing [see DCosta (2002), for example]. We group these FDI mode as Nonmandated MNC.
2Empirically, this is consistent with the global FDI ows documented by Brainard (1997) and Markusen
and Maskus (2002), which document a predominant type in Horizontal MNCs. Further, the context es-
tablished is also consistent with international production fragmentation studies such as Athukorala (2005),
Athukorala and Hill (2010), which implies that truly innovative MNCs consist only of a small share of all
the vertically-integrated MNCs due to vastly di¤erent resource requirements in production fragmentation,
resulting in some being technological- and skill-intensive than others.
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relationships between human capital and FDI-promoting policies [Javorcik 2004; Liu 2008;
Kottaridi and Stengos 2010], suggesting potential policy complementarities to be gained by
using a mixture of these policies. Nonetheless, overly narrowed investment incentives have
also been documented to result in adverse signalling e¤ects in many developing economies,
in that many generous incentives targeted solely at top quality MNCs have often failed to
achieve intended results. This is often the key nding of the race-to-the-bottomliterature3,
and is treated as a stylised fact for MNCs in developing economies that we also seek to
model.
3 The Model
We build on the industrial transformation model of Agénor and Dinh (2013) and Agénor
and Alpaslan (2014) by introducing non-pecuniary externalities associated with presence of
foreign experts. Specically, the skills acquisition feature and ve production sectors are
retained. For the foreign sector, to avoid further complicating a sophisticated model, the
determination of the di¤erent types of foreign subsidiary mode operating in the host economy
is largely independent of domestic production.
It is assumed that there is only one foreign source country that deploys subsidiary units
in the form of experts to the host economy. Dunnings internalisation advantage seeks
to understand how foreign MNCs shape their in-housepreference with respect to the in-
volvement in di¤erent production of a host economy. To construct a stylized framework
that links this idea to the human capital distribution of the host economy, we adopt a nested
Dixit-Stiglitz CES value function framework that is often used empirically to model heteroge-
neous rms along a continuous distribution [see Brambilla et al. (2009) for example]. Then,
drawing on the ideas of Markusen and Tromenko (2009), each subsidiary unit consists of
one foreign expert with specic process know-how that is only available in the foreign source
country. Specically, standardisation know-how [used in imitation] for Horizontal MNC, and
3For examples, see Blomström (2002), OECD (2008), and Olney (2013).
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sophisticated know-how [used in innovation] for Vertical MNC. Consequently, the presence
of Vertical MNC is a necessary condition for innovation sector to exist. As our focus is on
middle-income economy with both imitation and innovation sectors, the role of nonman-
dated subsidiaries in domestic production is largely abbreviated, modelled only as a base
entry mode.
As a result of foreign rms being e¤ectively experts with specialised human capital, a
dichotomous relationship exists between domestic and foreign rms. For domestic rms,
only the average productivity of workers matters. For foreign subsidiaries, they perceiving
heterogeneity among the productivity of domestic workers. As individual ability of domestic
workers is not fully observable to foreign rms [though they do know the overall distrib-
ution], for two di¤erent skilled workers used to produce a same blueprint variety, foreign
experts would have an additional layer of preference to be matchedto a worker with higher
productivity a trasformation of ability hence resulting in a Melitz (2003) type of sorting
process. In deciding on operational mode, foreign experts are therefore sorted along the
ability distribution of the host economy, resulting in di¤erent threshold values for di¤erent
modes of operation. Consequently, these create an indirect link between the foreign MNCs
operational choice and domestic workers skills acquisition decision. In other words, we
explain internalisation advantageas resulting from the implicit productivity requirement-
induced information cost4 Lastly, a demand feedback channel from the industrial state of host
economy to MNC composition-determination is also introduced using an endogenous prefer-
ence parameter in the foreign expertsobjective function, consistent with the international
product market dimension described by Felipe et al. (2012).
4Uncertainty of such nature may broadly be known as some sort of information cost, arising from asym-
metry in either demand or supply factors. An example of such cost is examined in Hortsmann and Markusen
(1996), though our paper specically attempts to link this choice of MNCs to the ability distribution of
workers in the host economy.
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3.1 Domestic Sectors in Host Economy
Households: There is a continuum of dynastic representative households growing at an
exogenous rate n > 0. Given initial number of members , L0 in each household, the size
of the representative family at time t is Lt = exp(nt)L0. Each individual members within
a household is assumed to possess identical ability level, a, though di¤erent abilities are
assumed at the household level. Ability follows a Pareto distribution, indexed by a 2 [am;1),
with probability density function f(a) = am=a
1+, cumulative distribution function F (a) =
1  (am=a), and mean ability of the population given by am=(  1),  > 2 and am > 1.
 is the Pareto index, where the larger the value, the smaller the proportion of people with
high cognitive ability. Solving the households intertemporal utility maximisation problem,
maxUat =
Z 1
t
exp[ (  n)(s  t)]L0

1  (cat )1=
1  1


ds; (1)
subject to budget constraint, _W at = rtW
a
t +(1 )Yt Ltcat , yields the familiar Euler equation
at the aggregate level,
_Ct
Ct
= (rt   ) + n; (2)
where rt is the riskfree interest rate, Yt the economys nal output,  2 (0; 1) the tax rate
on income,  > 0 the subjective discount rate,  the constant elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. The utility function of individual household member [depends on individ-
ual members consumption, cat ] assumes a constant relative risk aversion form. It is also
assumed that agents do not value leisure. Each representative household allocates consump-
tion equally among its members. In addition, household is not allowed to borrow, with the
standard transversality condition assumed.
In terms of skills acquisition, individual members decide whether to acquire skills or work
immediately as unskilled workers, taking wages and interest rate as given. Skill acquisition
decisions are therefore made to maximise each members discounted wage income. An in-
dividual with ability a 2 [am;1), fully observable by both domestic rms and individuals,
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can either choose to enter the labour force at t as an unskilled worker and earn from then
on the wage wUt [which is independent of workers ability] or decide to undergo training by
incurring a training cost,  , with e¢ ciency of training being  > 0, before entering labour
force at t + T as a skilled worker and earns a wage of awSt . The education process occurs
during the period of (t; t+ T ), and a direct cost of tct is incurred.
Based on a generalised specication of Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), an individual
with ability a 2 [am;1) would opt to become a skilled worker if and only if
Z 1
t+T
exp[ (s  t)]awSs ds  tct 
Z 1
t
exp[ (s  t)]wUs ds; (3)
where tct =
R1
t+T
exp[ (s t)] a wSs ds is the discounted value of the skills acquisition cost,
assumed to be proportional to the skilled wages at   2 (0; 1). The inequality (3) shows that
the discounted value of the lifetime income of a skilled worker, after accounting for skills
acquisition cost during the period (t; T ), must be higher or at least equal to the opportunity
cost of discounted unskilled wage. Hence, there exists a threshold level of ability a^t such
that (3) holds as an equality, expressed as a^t = [exp(T ):(wUt =(1   )wSt )]1=.
If skills acquisition is assumed to take place instantaneously5, we can simplify to
a^t = [w
U
t =(1   )wSt ]1=: (4)
Given Pareto distribution for abilities, and that productivity of unskilled workers is as-
sumed to equal unity, the share of unskilled labour supply, U;t at time t equals
U;t =
LU;t
Lt
=
Z a^t
am
f(a)da = am
 a a^t
am
= [1  (am=a^t)] : (5)
Given (5), the raw supply of skilled labour at time t is calculated as Lt
R1
a^t
f(a)da =
(am=a^t)
Lt, though the average productivity of workers with ability a 2 [a^t;1) who have
5Given the innite horizon nature of the model, we follow Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2001) and Agénor
and Dinh (2013) in imposing the assumption of T = 0.
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acquired skills need to be accounted for. This gives the share of e¤ective supply of skilled
labour at time t, S;t, as
S;t =
LS;t
Lt
=
Z 1
a^t
af(a)da = am

a1 
1  
1
a^t
=
am
  1(a^t)
1 : (6)
Imitation: Following Agénor and Dinh (2013), the imitation sector produces imitative
blueprints that are purchased by rms producing basic intermediate inputs in the interme-
diate goods sector. Firms specialized in imitation employ only unskilled labour, in quantity
LU;I;t. There is no aggregate uncertainty in the research technology. The production ow,
_M It at any time t is given by:
_M It = (nFH;t)
 I1(M It +  
I
2nFV;tM
R
t )(
LU;I;t
Lt
); where  I1  0 and  I2 2 R, (7)
with the labour specication following the dilution e¤ectof Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999).
The productivity component of imitative goods depends on: (i) a standard initial stock
of blueprints (M It ), as in Joness (2005) standing-on-shoulderse¤ect, though at constant
return [Ang and Madsen 2015] ; (ii) size of the presence of Horizontal MNCs, which given
our denition of foreign rms, refers to the total number of foreign experts that bring know-
howto imitation production [expressed in proportion of total foreign rms, nFH;t]; and (iii)
an externality term associated with the size of Vertical MNCs in the innovation sector. As
implied in studies such as Markusen and Maskus (2002), on aggregate, Horizontal FDIs
are most likely to be imitation-enhancing, though an argument could be made for  I1 < 0 if
multinationals preemptively price domestic competition out of markets using their ownership
of superior technology, as described in Horstmann and Markusen (1987). The externality
term,  I2nFV;tM
R
t , indicates a spillover channel from the innovation sector. Consistent with
the industrial transformation thesis, as the size of the innovation sector grows and more
foreign subsidiaries opt to switch to operating as Vertical MNCs, we would expect the sign
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of  I2 to be negative. Nonetheless, given that positive empirical evidence is often reported
in regards to leading foreign innovatorsimpacts on domestic rmsproductivity, there is a
possibility of a mildly positive  I2 too. As such, the parameter,  
I
2, as well as the stepping
stone parameter,  R2 , introduced in the innovation sector, is examined across di¤erent values
using sensitivity analysis.
The optimisation problem of rms in the imitation sector is to select the amount of
unskilled labour to employ so as to maximise prots of It = R
I
t
_M It   (1 + I)wUt LU;I;t,
subject to (7), taking the imitative blueprint price (RIt ) and unskilled wage rate (w
U
t ) as
given. The parameter I is introduced as a proportionate cost factor in the imitation sector
that captures the impact of labour market distortions (for instance, additional hiring costs
arising from non-competitive labour market practices). The interior solution for unskilled
labour employment in imitation (LU;I;t > 0) is given by the following rst-order condition:
wUt =
1
1 + I
RIt
I
t
Lt
: (8)
Innovation: Firms in the innovation sector produce innovative blueprints using only skilled
labour (LS;R;t). In comparison to the employment specication made for imitation, innova-
tion sector is therefore skill-intensive. There is no aggregate uncertainty in innovation. The
research production ow at any time t is given by
_MRt = (nFV;t)
 R1 (MRt +  
R
2 M
I
t )(
LS;R;t
Lt
), where  R1  0 and  R2  0. (9)
As in the imitation sector, the production technology of innovative goods captures the
key knowledge spillover properties. Following Agénor and Dinh (2013), the research process
of innovation depends on both the stock of innovative and imitative blueprints, consistent
with the stepping stone e¤ect of imitation introduced by Glass (2010). The productivity
gains associated with the stepping stone e¤ect of imitative goods may be equal, stronger
( R2 > 1), or weaker ( 
R
2 < 1) than that of innovative goods. Consistent with studies such as
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Markusen (1995, 1998) and Braconier et al. (2005), Vertical MNCs, nFV;t, are specied as the
relatively skill-intensive type that engage in leading-edge innovation and therefore beneciary
to domestic innovation of host economy. Similar to the imitation sector, nFV;t, refers to the
total number of foreign experts that bring sophisticated know-howto innovation production
in the domestic economy.6 Likewise, to eliminate scale e¤ects, innovation employment is
specied as a ratio to total population.
The optimisation problem of rms in the innovation sector is to select the amount of
skilled labour to employ so as to maximise prots, Rt = Q
R
t
_MRt   (1 + R)wSt LS;R;t, subject
to (9), taking the patent price (QRt ) and skilled wage rate (w
S
t ) as given. The wage in the
innovation sector is a¤ected proportionally again by a cost parameter R. When R > I ,
it is comparatively costlier to hire skilled workers in innovation than unskilled workers in
imitation. This specication is consistent with the general nding documented in Haaland
and Wooton (2001).7
For an interior solution for skilled labour employment in innovation to exist (LS;R;t > 0),
the rst-order condition is given by
wSt = (
1
1 + R
)(
QRt
Lt
)(nFV;t)
 R1 [1 +  R2 (
mIt
mRt
)]MRt : (10)
Intermediate Goods: The two intermediate goods (IG) sectors are monopolistically com-
petitive. Each producer in the basic IG sector pays a one-o¤royalty payment, RIt , to purchase
one unit of imitative blueprint to produce one unit of basic intermediate input, while each
rm in the sophisticated IG sector pay patent price, QRt , to purchase one unit of innovative
blueprint to produce one unit of sophisticated input. In both sectors, each basic IG rm
maximizes prots by setting price P k;st = 1= for good s, 8s = 1; :::Mkt , where k = I; R.
6A more accurate modelling approach would be to introduce top domestic experts, but such experts
are usually non-existent in a developing economy. Instead, we introduce a foreign-to-domestic innovation
expertise ratio, 	t = nFV;t= S;R;t, where S;R;t = LS;R;t=Lt, later as a proxy measure to compare across
policy outcomes.
7In their studies, Haaland and Wooton (2001) examine the e¤ects of labour market rigidities, especially
redundancy payments, on MNCschoice of investment destination. They document that, those sectors with
relatively less certainty in production, such as the innovation sector, tend to have more rigid labour market.
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In symmetric equilibrium, the associated quantity demanded for basic, xIt , and sophisti-
cated intermediate, xRt , at individual rm level are given by
xIt = (
Yt
M It
) and xRt = (1  )(
Yt
MRt
), (11)
where  2 (0; 1) is the share of basic intermediates in composite intermediates.
The maximum prot for basic IG producers in a current period t is then derived as
It = (1  )(
Yt
M It
): (12)
Standard arbitrage implies that the blueprint price must be equal to the present dis-
counted stream of prots. For simplicity, we follow Agénor and Canuto (2012) and assume
that all the prots of an imitative blueprint, excluding capital gain, go into the imitative
blueprint price, RIt set in equilibrium. This yields R
I
t = 
I
t .
Meanwhile, unlike imitative blueprints, patented blueprints are innitely-lived. Each
sophisticated IG rm sets its price to maximise prots, given the perceived demand function.
Their maximum prot is derived as
Rt = (1  )(1  )(
Yt
MRt
): (13)
To derive the equilibrium price of a patent for sophisticated input, QRt , recall that stan-
dard no-arbitrage condition requires that the rate of return on private capital must equal
to the rate of return on the exclusive holding of an innovative blueprint for sophisticated
intermediate inputs, that is rt = Rt =Q
R
t +
_QRt =Q
R
t , which can be rearranged to yield
_QRt = rtQ
R
t   Rt : (14)
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Final Output: There is a continuum of identical domestic rms producing a homogenous
nal good, indexed by i 2 (0; 1). Production by individual domestic rm i requires the
use of rm-specic private capital, Kit , skilled labour, LS;Y;t, unskilled labour, LU;Y;t, and
composite intermediate input, X it . Production by individual rm i takes the form of a
standard Cobb-Douglas specication:
Y it = (LS;Y;i;t)
S(LU;Y;i;t)
U (X it)
(Kit)
[
Kt
(Lt)
]%; (15)
where % > 0,  > 0;  2 (0; 1), S 2 (0; 1), U 2 (0; 1),  2 (0; 1), and + (S + U) +  = 1
to reect constant returns to scale in rm-specic inputs LS;Y;i;t, LU;Y;i;t, X it , and K
i
t . The
aggregate private capital stock, Kt =
R 1
0
Kitdi, asserts a conventional learning externality at
magnitude %, but is subject to a population congestion e¤ect of .
Faced with competitive markets for private inputs, standard prot maximisation by iden-
tical rms in a symmetric equilibrium yields rst-order conditions for rt, wSt , w
U
t , x
I
s;t, and
xRs;t:
rt = 
Yt
Kt
  ; (16)
wSt =
S
1 + Y
Yt
LS;Y;t
; wUt =
U
1 + Y
Yt
LU;Y;t
; (17)
xks;t = (
kZkt
P k;st
)1=(1 ); s = 1; :::M{t ; with Z
k
t = Yt=
Z Mkt
0
(xks;t)
ds; (18)
where k = I; R, I = , R = 1   , P I;st (PR;st ) is the price of basic (sophisticated)
intermediate good s, wSt (w
U
t ) the skilled (unskilled) wage rate, rt the net rental rate of
private capital, and  2 (0; 1) the rate of depreciation for private capital. Note that a third
cost mark-up parameter Y is introduced again for the sector-specic hiring.
Given that both the technology and demand for all intermediate types are the same,
the equilibrium for both intermediate types are symmetric too. In a symmetric equilibrium,RMIt
0
(xIs;t)
ds = M It (x
I
t )
 and
RMRt
0
(xRs;t)
ds = MRt (x
R
t )
. The composite intermediate inputs
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can then be written as
Xt = [(M
I
t )
1=xIt ]
 [(MRt )
1=xRt ]
1  ; (19)
where xIs;t, s 2 (0;M It ) refers to basic intermediate inputs, xRs;t, s 2 (0;MRt ) sophisticated
intermediate inputs,  2 (0; 1) and 1=(1   ) > 1 the price elasticity of demand for each
intermediate input.
To derive an expression for the aggregate nal output of the economy, the number of
rms engaged in the production of nal goods is normalised to unity, Yt =
R 1
0
Y it di, which
implies that the aggregate skilled and unskilled labour used in the nal output sector are
given by LS;Y;t =
R 1
0
LS;Y;i;tdi and LU;Y;t =
R 1
0
LU;Y;i;tdi respectively. Using (15), the aggregate
nal output Yt can be written as
Yt = (LS;Y;t)
S(LU;Y;t)
U (Xt)
(Kt)
[
Kt
(Lt)
]%: (20)
Finally, the law of motion for the private capital is given by the standard form of:
_Kt = It   Kt: (21)
3.2 Foreign Sector
Stylised Framework to explain Internalisation advantage: To characterise the me-
chanics of foreign subsidiariesdeployment, we use a three-staged, nested Dixit-Stiglitz CES
objective function framework adapted from Allanson and Montagna (2005) and Brambilla et
al. (2009). In each period, it is assumed that there is a mass of foreign subsidiaries, j = 1; :::;
NF , entering the host economy, with the salaries/prots of the experts/subsidiaries assumed,
for simplicity, to be paid by the planner of the foreign source economy.8
8A more conventional approach is to specify that the salaries/prots of foreign experts/subsidiaries to
be determined in the host economy. However, as applicable to most actual instances in real life, experts of
MNC subsidiaries deployed to developing economies for assignments do receive their remuneration from the
headquarters. In addition, unlike models treating FDI as capital stock, our main emphasis is on heterogeneous
FDI compositions and how such choice is a¤ected by skills distribution of a host economy. The usual returns
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Specically, in the rst stage, the planner of the foreign source economy determines
the allocation of aggregate salary expenditure for experts deployed overseas. Based on a
standard Cobb-Douglas value maximisation specication, max uFt = z
%
H;tz
1 %
q;t , in each time
period, where the exogenously given aggregate salary expenditure (IF ) is allocated between
salary expenditure for experts in our host economy of interest (zq) and for simplicity, other
host economies collectively (zH). This yields yFt = (1   %)IFt , where yF is the total salary
expenditure allocated for the specic host economy examined. By denition, yFt = w
FNF;t
too, where wF is some exogenously given wage rate paid by the foreign headquarter and NF;t
is the total number of foreign experts in the host economy studied.
Having determined the allocation in the rst stage, a stylised institutional approach is
specied in the second stage. Depending on the mode chosen, investmentin the host econ-
omy is assumed to be in terms of the intermediate variety an expert is randomly matched to.
Collectively, the pool of foreign experts assigned to the host economy forms a representative
value function over a composite of intermediate varieties, with a further layer of shadow
qualityascribed to capture the preference of foreign experts to be matched to workers of
higher productivity, within the same variety type that they are matched to.9
Specically, the value function is given by
UFt = f
 
[
Z MFP
s=0
(x0s;FP )
F 1
F ds]
F
F 1 ]
F 1
F
!
(22)
+f(
Z NF
j=0
[
Z MIt
s=0
1;t(x
I
s;FH;t)
F 1
F ds+
Z MRt
s=0
2;t(x
R
s;FV;t)
F 1
F ds]
F 1
F dj)g 
F
F 1 ;
where MFP ;M It ;M
R
t denote the default, imitative, and innovative varieties over Nonmanda-
tory, Horizontal, xIs;FH;t, and Vertical investments, x
R
s;FV;t; 
F and F are elasticities of sub-
stitution within and between intermediates, with F > F > 1 assumed as in Brambilla et al.
motive is therefore abridged and simplied as an exogenous salary expenditure paid by foreign planner to
the entire pool of foreign experts.
9By construction, the quality di¤erencebetween investments in a host country for the foreign experts
in this model reects solely the perceived di¤erence in productivity among the domestic workers.
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(2009). 2;t and 1;t represent foreign preferences for investment of Vertical and Horizontal
MNC respectively.10
Solving the optimisation problem with a nested foreign preference structure would yield
a series of theoretical investment demand functions and shadow investment prices for each
variety s and productivity di¤erence-induced quality j.
FDI Compositions in Host Economy: In stage three, a rms dynamic entry decision
is modelled as a static decision in opting for investment mode.11 Upon entry, foreign rms
rst assume a nonmandated MNC mode and to simplify matters, no subsequent exit is
allowed. Further, in each period t, a rm can opt to stay as nonmandated MNC [incurring a
basic doing-businesscost of F0]; incurring additional cost, F1 on top of F0 to upgrade into
Horizontal MNC; or incur F0+F2 to operate as a Vertical MNC. F2 > F1 > F0 is assumed. In
the context of each foreign subsidiary being a foreign expert, these mean foreign subsidiaries
have the option to upgradeand bring in an expert with more advanced processes in every
period, by incurring higher cost.12
As stated, unlike domestic rms, each foreign expert coming in with know-how perceives
heterogeneity among productivity of domestic workers. This asymmetry leads to a produc-
tivity requirement-induced information cost component, 1=$, that is implicitly priced in by
foreign experts when deciding on the choice of operational mode. This productivity is a trans-
formation of ability. For simplicity, a one-to-one relationship is assumed, where $ = a=~a,
with a being value along the ability distribution of the host economy and 1 < ~a < 1 some
exogenously specied constant value. 1=$ is therefore also characterised by a Pareto distri-
bution. Due to persistence, for those who have become skilled, it is assumed that a more
10As shown later, foreign preferences are endogenous to the state of industrial development of a host
economy, providing a key feedback channel of the host economys industrial state to FDI via the product
market dimensions. Nevertheless, it is taken as given by the pool of foreign experts when solving for the
optimisation problem in every period.
11Similarly, we also adopt their assumptions where heterogeneous foreign rms are assumed to behave in
a homogenous manner within the same MNC type.
12Consistent with the nature of most common doing-business costs surveyed, such as time to acquire
permits and number of administrative procedures in transactions, these costs are treated as deadweight
losses in this model, instead of being fees collected by the host government.
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able individual pre-skills acquisition would remain more productive over another individual
with lower ability pre-skills acquisition, resulting in a Melitz (2003) type of sorting of foreign
subsidiaries on 1=$. Specically, for any intermediate variety s at time t, solving (22), we
can express an optimal shadow price of investment [from the perspective of foreign experts]
as a function of productivity, $, that is,
Ps;t =

F
F   1

($s;t) ; (23)
priced at F=(F   1) > 1 times of $s;t.13
This implies that, for any investment of variety s, the larger the productivity requirement-
induced information cost is (lower$s;t), the lower is the theoretical investment price ascribed
by the foreign experts. The basic idea is as follows. While a lower value of a^t from the labour
supply side indicates a larger pool of skilled labour in the host economy, a lower value of a
from the perspective of foreign investors would imply a stricter entry threshold. We would
expect an order of the threshold values for the three FDI types to be aFV < aFH < aFP , since
a potential Vertical MNC would have a stricter entry threshold than a potential Horizontal
MNC.
Further, a second source of asymmetry between Vertical and other MNCs is introduced.
The introduction of this asymmetry seeks to account for the decreasing returns of labour
factors on the MNCsbenets, as documented in studies such as Blomström and Kokko
(2003). It turns out that this decreasing return feature is key in preventing non-converging
explosive growth. It also allows us to provide an alternative proposition to Braconier et al.
(2005) or the race-to-the-bottomliteratures in explaining the empirical documentation of
weak Vertical MNC activities in developing economies, despite most developing governments
competing for their inward presence. Specically, when a foreign subsidiary is confronted
with the decision to upgrade to Vertical mode, the cost associated with the productivity
13Given that the perceived quality di¤erence among investment is driven by perceived heterogeneity among
productivity of domestic workers, this price is implicit in nature and reects the valueplaced by foreign
experts on a specic intermediate variety s.
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requirement is subject to a parameter , such that $ > 0; $0() < 0 is now priced by
the foreign experts to reect the increasing di¢ culties in telling apart the best (highest
productivity) among the brightest of skilled workers. To explain intuitively, say for example,
as a given value of a gets smaller [1=$ gets larger] and smaller [note that if from the supply
side, it means the actual quantity of skilled labour in host economy is actually larger],
a negative value for parameter  would indicate increasing di¢ culties in identifying and
matching to the most productive skilled workers. As the pool of skilled workers gets larger,
the most productive would be harder to distinguish from other skilled workers.
The two dichotomous features discussed in the foreign sector characterise the stylised in-
ternalisation advantageframework that determines FDI compositions in this model. Equa-
tion (23), together with theoretical investment demand functions across di¤erent varieties,
allow us to express individual value function for a typical foreign expert j opting for either
nonmandated (FP ), Horizontal (FH), or Vertical (FV ) operational mode [see Appendix
B]. Imposing zero prots for foreign experts across the three types, we set FP ($FP ) = 0,
FH($FH) = FP ($FH), and FH($

FV ) = FV ($

FV ). Then, given that Pj = Ps = LI is
assumed in symmetric equilibrium [Lerner Index, LI is a time-invariant structural parameter
generalising market competitiveness in host economy], the three minimum threshold values
for MNCsinternalisation decision in any period t can be expressed as
$FP;t =
aFP;t
~a
=
"
F0 
(F   1)F 1=(F )F 1(yFt ) 1

P 
F 1
F;t
#1=(1 F )
; (24)
$FH;t =
aFH;t
~a
=
"
F1 
(F   1)F 1=(F )F 1(yFt ) 1

P 
F 1
F;t [
F
1;t (LI)
F F   1]
#1=(1 F )
;
(25)
$FV;t =
aFV;t
~a
=
"
(F2   F1) 
(F   1)F 1=(F )F 1(yFt ) 1

P 
F 1
F;t (LI)
F F [F2;t   F1;t ]
#1=[(1 F )]
;
(26)
where F0, F1, F2 are the doing-businesscosts; F , 
F , yFt , , 1;t, 2;t are as dened earlier;
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and PF;t is a theoretical aggregate investment price index that is substituted out later.
To calculate the shares of foreign rms by FDI type, recall that the sorting of foreign
rms follows that of 1=$. We know that the cumulative distribution function of a typical
Pareto distribution z, takes the form of F (z) = 1  (zmin=z) for some minimum of z, zmin.
Let F (1=$) = F (~a=a). Further, by assuming that there is no exit option for MNCs, we
can set aFP = ~a=amin8t, where ~a=amin denotes some minimum threshold value of entry by
foreign rms (a large value along the ability distribution). At any time t, the proportion of
the three types of foreign rms are given by
nFP;t =
NFP;t
NF;t
= [F (1=$FH;t)  F (1=$FP;t)] = [1  (aFH;t
aFP
)] , (27)
nFH;t =
NFH;t
NF;t
= [F (1=$FV;t)  F (1=$FH;t)] = [(aFH;t
aFP
)   (aFV;t
aFP
)], (28)
nFV;t =
NFV;t
NF;t
= [1  F (1=$FV;t)] = (aFV;t
aFP
), (29)
where aFP , aFH , aFV give the host economy-specic threshold value of entry for Nonman-
dated, Horizontal, and Vertical MNCs. While nFH;t in (28) is determined by both aFH;t and
aFV;t, given xed aFP , (29) shows that the lower the value of aFV [therefore the stricter the
entry criteria for Vertical MNC], the smaller share of Vertical MNCs in the host economy.
Also, (27) shows that the lower the value of aFH [therefore stricter criteria for Horizontal
MNC], the larger the share of Nonmandated MNCs.
Some straightforward algebraic manipulations using (24)-(26) allow us to substitute out
yFt and PF;t, and establish two threshold conditions of
aFH;t =

F0
F1
((LI)
F F (1;t)
F   1)
 1=(1 F )
aFP , and (30)
aFV;t =
"
F2   F1
F0
1
(LI)F F [F2;t   F1;t ]
#1=[(1 F )]
a
1=
FP ~a
( 1)=. (31)
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In addition, a feedback channel on the state of industrial development of a host economy
to FDI composition is introduced. Given that FDI inows into the Southeast Asian regions
are found empirically to follow a Weibull distribution by Gander et al. (2009), we simplify
by modelling the two foreign preference parameters 1and 2 using a Weibull distribution,
governed by a hazard function of
1 = [1  h(2;!k; !)]2 = [1  (
!k
!
(
2
!
)!k 1)]2, (32)
where h(2;!k; !) denotes the hazard rate of 2
14, and !k and ! are the shape and scale
parameter respectively. As 1 is given by the expected value of E(2), this allows us to
endogenise foreign preference in a single parameter, QF , a demand-side feedback channel
depending on the state of industrial development of a host economy. This allows us to
rewrite (30) and (31) as
aFH;t =

F0
F1
((LI)
F F (QFt  1(QFt )!k)
F   1)
 1=(1 F )
aFP , and (33)
aFV;t =
"
F2   F1
F0
1
(LI)F F [(QFt )
F   (QFt  1(QFt )!k)
F
]
#1=[(1 F )]
a
1=
FP ~a
( 1)=, (34)
respectively, where 1 = (!k=!)(1=!)!k 1. For tractability, we assume that the foreign
MNCs set _QF = _mIt in each period.
15
Finally, using (27)-(29), (33), and (34), we write nFH;t and nFV;t as
nFH;t =

F0
F1
((LI)
F F (QFt  1(QFt )!k)
F   1)
 =(1 F )
  nFV;t, and (35)
14This means we assume that foreign investment preference in the mode of Horizontal MNC would reduce
over time in regards to investment preference in the mode of Vertical MNC. While this assumption seems
arbitrary, it provides a reasonable simplication that allows for feedback of industrial state in the host
economy to FDI composition through only a single foreign preference channel.
15The use of mIt in the feedback channel as a proxy that reects the state of industrial development in a
developing host economy is consistent with studies such as Yusuf and Nabeshima (2009). It also provides a
more general feature given that there are developing host economies that have only imitation production.
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nFV;t =

a
1=
FP ~a
( 1)=
 "F2   F1
F0
1
(LI)F F [(QFt )
F   (QFt  1(QFt )!k)
F
]
#=[(1 F )]
;
(36)
where 1 = (!k=!)(1=!)!k 1 and QFt = wmm
I
t (wm is a multiplicative constant).
As a result of the perceived heterogeneity of productivity among workers, and the assumed
ability-productivity relationship, the determination of nFH;t and nFV;t in any period t is
driven by the sorting process along the same ability distribution, and depends on threshold
ability values, aFH;t and aFV;t. Naturally, these result in some degree of direct tradeo¤
between nFH;t and nFV;t, as can be seen in (35), though it is also possible that an economy
can gain in both nFH;t and nFV;t.
3.3 Government and Market-clearing Conditions
Government: Most of the public policies in this paper are assumed to be nanced by
reallocating spending within the budget, so that the tax rate remains the same and the
overall balance remains. As such, we can assume a simplied government sector. A balanced
budget is maintained, and the government cannot issue bonds to borrow. At each time t,
the government taxes on nal output at the rate  to nance its expenditure Gt, as in
Gt = Yt: (37)
Market Equilibrium Conditions: Given that
RMIt
0
xIs;tds = M
I
t x
I
t and
RMRt
0
xRs;tds =
MRt x
R
t , the market-clearing condition for the nal goods market is given by
Yt = Ltc
a
t +M
I
t x
I
t +M
R
t x
R
t + It +Gt: (38)
Using (11), (37), equation (38) is rewritten to express private investment as
It = Ltc
a
t   (1     )Yt: (39)
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For the skilled and unskilled labour markets, we have
LS;Y;t + LS;R;t = LS;t; or S;Y;t + S;R;t = S;t; and (40)
LU;Y;t + LU;I;t = LU;t; or U;Y;t + U;I;t = U;t: (41)
In any given period t, the shares of foreign experts/subsidiaries in Nonmandated, Hori-
zontal, and Vertical mode in the host economy must sum up to one. This means
nFP;t = 1  nFH;t   nFV;t , nFP;t  0. (42)
3.4 Dynamic System and Steady-state
To generate endogenous growth, we impose the knife-edge conditions: Assumptions: S +
U   % = 0, (=) +  + % = 1.
Specically, denemIt = M
I
t =Kt, m
R
t = M
R
t =Kt, and using (19), (11), (20) can be written
as
Yt = (
S;Y
t )
S(U;Yt )
UL
S+U %
t (43)


((1  )1 )(mIt )(1 )=(mRt )(1 )(1 )=(
Yt
Kt
)

(Kt)
(=)++%;
where (Lt)0 = 1 if and only if 
S + U   % = 0. The level of output, Yt, is linear to the
private capital stock, Kt, if and only if (=) +  + % = 1.
The dynamic system of the economy is characterised by a di¤erential algebraic system
consisting of four rst-order di¤erential equations and seven static equations, as follows:
_mRt
mRt
= (nFV;t)
 R1 [1 +  R2 (
mIt
mRt
)](S;t   S;Y;t)  (1     )( Yt
Kt
) + zCt + ; (44)
_mIt
mIt
= (nFH;t)
 I1 [1 +  I2nFV;t(
mRt
mIt
)](U;t   U;Y;t)  (1     )( Yt
Kt
) + zCt + ; (45)
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_zCt
zCt
= n+ [  (1     )]( Yt
Kt
) + zCt   (+ ) + ; (46)
_QRt
QRt
= [(
Yt
Kt
)  ]  (1  )(1  )( Yt
Kt
)(
1
QRt
)(
1
mRt
); (47)
of which mIt and m
R
t are backward-looking state variables, while z
C
t and Q
R
t are forward-
looking jump variables.
The seven static equations are
Yt
Kt
=
2
[(S;Y;t)
S
(U;Y;t)
U
] 1=(1 )

(mIt )
(1 )=(mRt )
(1 )(1 )=	=(1 ) ; (48)
S;Y;t =
S(1 + R)
(1 + Y )
(
Yt
Kt
)[QRt (m
R
t )]
 1(nFV;t)  
R
1 [1 +  R2 (
mIt
mRt
)] 1; (49)
U;Y;t =
U(1 + I)
(1 + Y )(1  ) (nFH;t)
  I1 [1 +  I2nFV;t(
mRt
mIt
)] 1; (50)
U;t = 1  am[
U
S(1   )
S;Y;t
U;Y;t
] =; (51)
S;t =
am
  1[
U
S(1   )
S;Y;t
U;Y;t
](1 )=; (52)
nFH;t =

F0
F1
((LI) (wmmIt  1(wmmIt )!k)
F   1)
 =(1 F )
  nFV;t; (53)
nFV;t =

a
1=
FP ~a
( 1)=

(54)

"
F2   F1
F0
1
(LI)F F [(wmmIt )
F   (wmmIt  1(wmmIt )!k)
F
]
#=[(1 F )]
;
where 1 = (!k=!)(1=!)!k 1 and 2 = ((1  )1 )=(1 ).
The steady-state equilibrium is dened as an equilibrium path where the growth rate
of the aggregate representative householdsconsumption (nt + ( _cat =c
a
t )), the growth rate of
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the private capital stock ( _Kt=Kt), the growth rate of imitative blueprints ( _M It =Mt), and the
growth rate of innovative blueprints ( _MRt =M
R
t ) are all equal, whereas the imitative blueprint
price (RIt ), the patent price (Q
R
t ), rate of return on private capital (rt), real prices (P
I;s
t ,
PRt ), and shadow aggregate price index (PF;t) are constant. From the ve static conditions in
domestic sectors, (48)-(52), and the two equations determining number of Horizontal MNCs
and Vertical MNCs, (35) and (36), we also know that Yt=Kt , 
S;Y
t , 
U;Y
t , 
U
t , 
S
t , nFH;t, and
nFV;t are constant. These imply that: (i) nal output, private capital stock, and therefore
private consumption are growing at a same constant rate in steady-state; (ii) labour supplies
grow at the same rate as the population growth rate in steady-state; and (iii) the number of
foreign experts in imitation, nFH;t, and innovation, nFV;t, are constant.
In steady-state, these constancies indicate that the innovative blueprint-private capital
ratio (mRt ), imitative blueprint-private capital ratio (m
I
t ), as well as the private consumption-
private capital ratio (zCt ) are constant, resulting in _m
R
t = _m
I
t = _z
C
t =
_QRt = 0. Hence, the
left-hand side (LHS) of equations (44)-(47) can be set equal to zero to derive steady-state
values, ~mI , ~mR, ~zC , and ~QR. Given the non-linearities associated with mRt and m
I
t , complete
reduced form expressions for ~mI , ~mR, ~zC , and ~QRare determined numerically.
The complexity of the model means saddlepath stability cannot be established analyti-
cally, though local stability in the vicinity of computationally derived steady-states can be
established for selected congurations of model parameters. Nonetheless, since it cannot be
fully established analytically, some congurations of the model may result in the model being
locally indeterminate. This necessitates the use of a numerical method solving for a two-
point boundary value problem in any policy experiment, such as the relaxation algorithm of
Trimborn et al. (2008).16 Unlike conventional forward shooting methods and nite-horizon
discrete time approximation methods (see Judd, 1998), or the backward integration method
16The relaxation algorithm is a specic type of nite-di¤erence method designed to overcome typical
problems faced when solving high-dimensional continuous time growth models. In addition to approximating
the system of di¤erential equations with nite-di¤erence equations on a mesh of points in time, the algorithm
also applies a typical error minimisation procedure when approximating the time path of solutions. See
Trimborn et al. (2008) for further details.
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[Brunner and Strulik, 2002], the relaxation algorithm is more e¢ cient in dealing with high
dimensional systems and therefore allows us to trace out the unique transition dynamics
numerically for each of the policy experiments implemented. Likewise, local saddlepath sta-
bility is also established numerically by calculating the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the
linearised system for each simulation case considered.
4 Model Parameterisation
The model is calibrated for an upper-middle income country with both innovation and im-
itation sectors, as well as having non-zero Vertical MNCs. Malaysia, a Southeast Asian
economy that has successfully positioned itself as part of the global MNCsproduction value
chain yet struggles to switch to an innovation-led growth strategy, is chosen as the economy
studied.
On the household side, the annual discount rate, , and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, , are set at 0:04 and 0:27 [Agénor and Montiel 2008]. L0 is normalised to unity,
with the constant population growth rate, n, set at the ve-year average of 1:73 percent as
in 2008-12. The supply of skilled labour is measured in e¢ cient units of human capital,
and is therefore adjusted for average ability. For calibration purposes, given that rm-level
distribution of skills and training expenditure in Malaysia are not reported in surveys [Sander
and Hanusch 2012], the number of e¤ective skilled labour is proxied by the number of workers
with tertiary education. The calibration strategies for the remaining household parameters
would focus on producing an initial share of skilled workers, S at 0:240. This involves
assuming initial skills acquisition cost,  , to be high at 25 percent of skilled wages, though
given the recent establishment of meso-organisations fr human capital development, such as
Pembangunan Sumber Manusia Berhad (PSMB), the e¢ ciency of training,  is set highly
at 0:9. For the ability distribution, both the lower bound value, am and the Pareto index
parameter, , are set at minimum values that would satisfy  > 2 and am > 1.
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For imitation parameter,  I1, Lim (2015), in an empirical study using Productivity and
Investment Climate Survey (PICS) dataset for Malaysia, obtains econometric estimates in
the range of 0:20   0:35 for a foreign ownership dummy. The upper estimate is used in
our calibration to reect reasonable strength of spillover in the imitation sector, therefore
 I1 = 0:35. On the multiplicative parameter of  
I
2, we set  
I
2 =  0:3 for the initial baseline
to reect a mildly negative tradeo¤ between the productivity of domestic imitators and the
cross-term of leading foreign innovation experts and innovative blueprint stock.17
In the innovation sector, for  R1 , based on Yusuf and Nabeshima (2009), we set  
R
1 = 0:40.
The stepping stone e¤ect parameter,  R2 , is set initially to a high value of 9:5 to reect
the well-documented established industrial base of Malaysia (Kharas et al., 2010), though
sensitivity analysis reported later will further assess the e¤ect of a change in this parameter.
In the nal output sector, the elasticity of output with respect to private capital, , is set
at a fairly standard value of 0:3. The elasticity with respect to composite intermediates, ,
is set at 0:3, which is double the value of 0:15 used by Agénor and Alpaslan (2014) for a low-
income economy to reect the industrial status of Malaysia, though it remains slightly lower
than the 0:36 used by Funke and Strulik (2000) for developed economies. By implication
of the constant returns-to-scale assumption, that leaves a total of 0:4 between skilled and
unskilled labour. Agénor and Dinh (2013) set U at 0:2 for low-income economies. To
adjust for Malaysias middle-income country status while based on similar proportions to
S, the parameter U is set at 0:15, which leaves S = 0:25. The relative share of basic
intermediate in the composite intermediate inputs, , is set at 0:57. By comparison, Agénor
and Alpaslan (2014) use a high value of 0:90 for low-income economies. As we might expect
 to change with industrial transformation over time, a specic sub-section on endogenous
 is presented as part of the sensitivity analysis later. Lastly, following Agénor and Dinh
(2013), the depreciation rate for private capital, , is set at 0:068.
17As discussed earlier, the parameter  I2 can be interpreted as either a direct negative e¤ect on imitators
productivity as the size of innovation grows or a positive productivity spillover from leading foreign innovators
to domestic imitators, as documented econometrically by Kam (2013) specically for Malaysia. Sensitivity
analysis is therefore implemented to examine the steady-state implications under both cases.
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For the hiring cost mark-up parameters, an initial order of innovation, imitation, and nal
output sector in terms of rigidity is calibrated, in consistent with Sander and Hanusch (2012).
In Zeufack and Lim (2013), the hiring cost parameter in the knowledge-intensive sector [their
model does not distinguish between imitation and innovation] is set at 0:10. We set this as
the value for I , with Y = 0:05 being half of it while R = 0:20 doubles the value to
reect greater di¢ culties in hiring innovation workers. In the intermediate goods sectors, the
substitution parameter  for domestic production is set at 0:39 to capture a lower elasticity
of substitution between intermediate inputs, in comparison to the 0:54 used by Funke and
Strulik (2000) or the 0:60 used by Iacopetta (2011), but similar to the non-competitive
scenario of 0:40 studied in Sequeira (2011). In our views, this captures the unique context
of the Malaysian industry a highly specialised global electrical and electronic component
manufacturing hub, and part of the production network of large foreign MNCs. Lastly, the
tax rate,  , is set to 0:25, which corresponds to the average e¤ective tax rate.
Moving on to the foreign sector, in the representative objective function for foreign
experts, recall the assumption of F > F > 1, as in Brambilla et al. (2009). The between-
variety elasticity, F , is rst set arbitrarily at 2. The across-variety elasticity for foreign
preference, F , is then set at 1:64, which is calibrated to reect a corresponding substitution
parameter of 0:61, the value used by Agénor and Alpaslan (2014) for substitution parameter
in the production side. This is calibrated to reect the di¤erent preferences of foreign experts
who come in with di¤erent know-how, though the combination of calibrated values for F and
F is reasonably consistent with studies using nested utility framework. The calibration for
the Lerner Index, LI, is based on the average empirical estimates of prot margin, 0:2544,
for Malaysian manufacturing rms by Zeufack and Lim (2013). A simple approximation
measure for LI is just 1   0:2544 = 0:7456. For the basic doing-business cost of F0, a
value of 0:2733 is calibrated, based on the average cost of business start-up procedures
reported in the World Bank Doing Business Surveys 2004-08. For F1and F2, given the
imposed assumption of F2 > F1 > F0, F1 = 0:33 and F2 = 0:40 are set, which imply that
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the cost incurred by foreign subsidiaries to come in with experts with standardisation and
sophisticated know-how would be one-third and 40 percent of a baseline price. As policy
scenarios involving cuts in F1and F2 are examined extensively in simulation exercises later,
these initial calibrated values are intended to reect an initial situation where it is expensive
for foreign experts to operate in the host economy. The asymmetric cost parameter,  =  1
is conveniently set to reect a constant rate of decreasing return associated with 1=$.18
The total number of foreign experts entering the host economy, NF;t in each period is
normalised to one. In terms of the parameters in the Weibull process used to model the
evolution of foreign preferences, the shape parameter, !k, and the scale parameter, !, are
set equal to 1 and 2 respectively. For the shares of the three di¤erent types, the FDI com-
positions for Malaysia are estimated using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). Due to the constraints of existing FDI statistics classication (by broad industry or
country, not MNCsoperations or value chain), the breakdown based on American MNCs
foreign a¢ liates from BEA is used, as it is the only national agency with su¢ ciently long
time series of such detail nature.19 Based on the estimates, the initial proportion of Nonman-
dated (nFP ), Horizontal (nFH), and Vertical MNCs (nFV ) are calibrated to equal 0:3099,
0:6737, and 0:0164 respectively. To obtain these initial values for the FDI compositions in an
initial steady-state that is saddlepath stable, it turns out that the constant value ~a, and the
constant term, wm in the international product market dimension feedback channel are set
simultaneously at 9:55 and 3:6 respectively. Lastly, based on all the calibrated parameters,
we estimate the initial value of aFP at 24:656.
To establish that the initial steady-state is consistent with aFV < aFH < aFP , rst,
rearranging (29) would allow us to calculate the threshold entry value for Vertical FDI,
aFV , to equal 3:155. Then, given the values for aFV , aFP , the initial steady-state value
18For robustness check, we experimented with an increasing rate of decreasing return ( <  1), and a
decreasing rate of decreasing return (0 <  <  1). For the range of  values where the model still solves,
the calibration of  does not produce signicant di¤erence to the policy experiment results later.
19The classication is based on Markusen (1998) and Braconier et al. (2005). The BEA data on US
majority-owned nonbank foreign a¢ liates is used to estimate the MNC compositions. See Appendix A.
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for nFH , and other calibrated parameters, the threshold value for Horizontal FDI, aFH , is
calculated by rearranging (28), yielding aFH = 23:392 < aFP . The theoretical condition of
aFV < aFH < aFP is therefore satised in the initial steady-state.
For the main variables of interest, the calibrations are as follows. As stated, from data,
we know S = 0:240. Further, based on the percentage share of R&D researchers in Malaysia,
the share of e¤ective skilled labour in innovation, S;R, is estimated at 0:045. These imply
that S;Y = 0:195. Knowing the initial values for S and S;Y , as well as other calibrated
values (am, , , 
S, U), we can rearrange (52) to calculate for the unskilled labour share
in nal output sector, U;Y = 0:0231. Then, rearranging (51), the share of unskilled labour,
U , would equal 0:9856. By implication, U;I is then 0:9625. On the industrial composition
ratio, the average of Malaysias share of high technological exports as percentage of total
manufactured exports is calculated for the year between 2008 and 2011, yielding 0:4164.
The industrial composition ratio measures the ratio, mt = mIt=(m
R
t +m
I
t ), which means its
initial steady-state value would equal 1   0:4164 = 0:5836. In terms of relative domestic
innovation expertise, the foreign-to-domestic innovation expertise ratio, 	t, is dened as the
ratio of the number of foreign experts with sophisticated know-how to the number of skilled
workers in innovation sector. Recalling that both NF;t and Lt are normalised to one, we
can therefore write 	t = nFV;t= S;R;t to compute for the innovation expertise ratio in each
period. The initial steady-state value is 	t = 0:3672. Finally, for the initial steady-state
growth rate of nal output, a multiplicative constant is introduced to yield both the initial
nal output and private capital stock growth rates to equal 4:3 percent per annum, which
corresponds to the average growth rate for Malaysia during 2008-13. By implication of the
steady-state properties, private consumption growth equals 4:3 percent. Table 1-3 summarise
the parameter values.
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T a ble 3
C alib ra te d P arame te r V a lues: B enc hmark (fo r F o re ign sec to r)
P a ra m e te r V a lue D e s c riptio n
a F 2 . 0 E la stic ity o f fo re ign p re fe re nc e , b e tw e e n va rie tie s
S F 1 . 6 4 E la stic ity o f fo re ign p re fe re nc e , a c ro ss va rie tie s
P 0 1 . 0 B a se line p ric e , P la tfo rm F D I’s inve stm ent
L I 0 . 7 4 5 6 L e rne r Ind ex, p ro xy fo r p ric ing c o mp etitio n
F 0 0 . 2 7 3 3 B asic d o ing- b usine ss co st inc urred o n fo re ign exp e rts
F 1 0 . 3 3 A d d itio na l co s t inc urre d o n H o rizo nta l M N C
F 2 0 . 4 0 A d d itio na l co s t inc urre d o n V ertica l M N C
ã 9 . 5 5 C o nsta nt va lue link ing p ro d uc tivity to ab ility
d ? 1 . 0 A sym me tric c o st p a ra m ete r, V e rtic a l M N C - sp e c ific
g k 1 . 0 S hap e p arame te r, W eib ull func tio n
g V 2 . 0 S lo p e p ara me te r, sp re a d o f W eib ull d istrib utio n
w m 3 . 6 C o nsta nt, fe e d b a c k to fo re ign p re fe re nc e
Table 1
Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark (for Host Economy)
Parameter Value Description
Households
_ 0.04 Annual discount rate
a 0.27 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
n 0. 0173 Population growth rate
Y 0. 9 Productivity parameter (efficiency of skills acquisition)
@ 0.25 Skills acquisition cost (in proportion of skilled wage)
e 2. 001 Pareto index, breadth of ability distribution in host economy
Final Output
J 0. 3 Elasticity with respect to private capital
KU 0.15 Elasticity with respect to unskilled labour
KS 0.25 Elasticity with respect to skilled labour
L 0. 3 Elasticity wrt composite intermediate input
X 0.57 Share of basic input in composite intermediate input
CY 0.05 Cost mark-up due to labour market distortions
N 0. 068 Rate of depreciation, private capital
Intermediate goods
R 0.39 Substitution parameter for production, intermediate goods
Table 2
Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark (for Host Economy, continue)
Parameter Value Description
Imitation sector
f1
I 0.35 Elasticity wrt number of foreign experts in Horizontal mode
f2
I ?0. 3 Externality, Vertical MNCs and innovative blueprint
CI 0.1 Cost mark-up due to labour market distortions
Innovation sector
f1
R 0.4 Elasticity wrt number of foreign experts in Vertical mode
f2
R 9.5 Stepping stone effect, from stock of imitative goods
CR 0.2 Cost mark-up due to labour market distortions
Government
b 0.25 Effective tax rate on final output
5 Policy Experiments
Similar to Agénor and Dinh (2013) and Agénor and Alpaslan (2014), policy outcomes con-
cerning the industrial structure [measured by the industrial composition ratio of mt =
mIt=(m
R
t +m
I
t )] and total skilled workforce expansion [measured by both skilled labour share,
S;t, and skilled labour in innovation, S;R;t] are the key policy indicators to be examined. To
measure progress on the deepening of domestic innovation expertise, the foreign-to-domestic
innovation expertise ratio, 	t, is examined as it provides a more meaningful policy inter-
pretation than the individual measure of share of Vertical MNCs, nFV;t, and share of skilled
labour in innovation, S;R;t.
Given that the key interest here is structural transformation (a long-term policy reform
issue and therefore needs to be analysed independent of business cycle inuence), and the fact
that FDI, unlike portfolio investment, is stable over time, all policy experiments considered
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are permanent in nature. Policies considered in addition to foreign investment liberalisation
measures are in the broad area of human capital policies, specically a permanent reduction
in skills acquisition cost and a permanent removal of hiring cost mark-up in the innovation
sector. In addition, to ensure that households do not permanently lose out due to transfor-
mation, the long run steady-state e¤ect on aggregate private consumption growth ( _Ct=Ct)
is also evaluated, with a policy option considered to be acceptable only if the growth rate is
sustained or increases in steady-state.20 Individual policies are rst discussed, followed by
three variations of composite programme. These are then followed by a specic subsection
on sensitivity analysis on endogenous technological change, where the parameter  is made
endogenous to the state of industrial transformation.
5.1 Individual Policies
Skills Acquisition Cost: Consider rst a permanent reduction in skills acquisition cost,
 , from 0:25 to 0:18. The 28 percentage reduction is consistent with the reported target of
PSMB in Malaysia, and may be thought of as a subsidy scheme designed to reduce the cost
of pursuing advanced skills, obtained by reallocating spending within the budget, so that
the tax rate and the overall balance remain the same.
The cost reduction associated with skills acquisition induces more workers to invest in
skills. This leads to an expansion in both the shares of skilled labour employed in the nal
output and the innovation sector. At rst, the increase in skilled labour supply lowers skilled
wages. At the same time, the rise in skilled employment promotes activities in nal output
sector, hence raising the marginal product of unskilled workers and consequently, unskilled
wages. This nets o¤ some of the skills acquisition incentive, resulting in scaling backfor
both e¤ective shares of total skilled labour and those employed in innovation. The respective
20When solving for the transitional dynamics, the numerical method of relaxation algorithm allocates
mesh points unevenly such that the time di¤erence between result observations generated increasingly widens
over time. The steady-state result therefore would dominate other observations along the time path in any
integrable measure like the conventional welfare calculations. Higher steady-state growth in aggregate private
consumption therefore necessarily reects improvement in welfare.
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absolute deviations from initial steady-state are 0:69 and 0:13 percentage points.
The innovation sector expands while the imitation sector contracts, leading to a decline
in the industrial composition ratio by 0:43 percentage points. Similar to S, the initial con-
traction of imitative varieties is more signicant than the end steady-state e¤ect. However,
as the ratio of skilled and unskilled employment is ultimately tied to the relative wage ratio,
the eventual scale-backof unskilled employment causes the industrial composition ratio to
settle at a slightly lower level than initial steady-state. This is the same for the proportion
of foreign experts with sophisticated know-how, nFV , where despite uneven paths along the
transition, long run permanent changes are negligible. In terms of the relative measure of
foreign-to-domestic innovation expertise ratio, 	 declines from 0:3672 to 0:3527. This indi-
cates a small deepening of relative domestic innovation expertise by 3:9 percent. Lastly, the
steady-state e¤ect on aggregate private consumption growth is negligible though the policy
is able to sustain a positive absolute deviation.
In Table 4, additional sensitivity analysis on key elasticity parameters in both the innova-
tion ( R1 and  
R
2 ) and imitation ( 
I
1 and  
I
2) sectors are carried out. It can be seen that the
impact on industrial transformation is more profound the larger the learning e¤ect ( R2 ) is,
as the economy benets from the greater strength of the stepping stone from imitation. The
di¤erence for the other variables are generally negligible. These results are consistent with
those in Agénor and Dinh (2013), where strong learning e¤ects mean greater improvement
in the productivity of innovation workers. In the case of  I2, if the externality associated
with the cross term, nFV;tMRt , is specied as a positive feedback to imitation, the industrial
transformation outcomes are similar to the benchmark case though the gain in domestic
innovation expertise is smaller.
Hiring Cost in Innovation Sector: Next, consider a reduction of cost mark-up in the
hiring of skilled researchers, with a permanent reduction in R from 0:2 to 0:0.
As seen in Figure 1, transitional dynamics are largely similar to skills acquisition cost-cut,
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though the scale-backe¤ect is less pronounced, as the policy e¤ects here operate mainly
through the skilled labour market reallocation channel. As skilled workers become relatively
cheaper in the production of innovative blueprints, more skilled labour are employed away
from the nal output sector. However, similar to skills acquisition cost cut, there is the
secondary scale-backe¤ect that mitigates the expansion. The decline in the cost of skilled
labour in innovation tends to raise the unskilled-skilled wage ratio, which would then take
away some of the skills acquisition incentive associated with the initial expansion. The
re-allocation of skilled labour away from S;Y to S;R would result in S;R increasing by
0:72 percentage points at end steady-state, while S;Y declining by 0:58 percentage points.
Overall, total e¤ective skilled labour share expands by 0:14 percentage points.
Similarly, the expansion in innovation relative to imitation is also more e¤ective, as seen
in a larger permanent reduction of 3:25 percentage points in the industrial ratio, m. Similar
to the results of skills acquisition cost cut, the steady-state e¤ect on nFV resulting from
this policy is negligible. However, the policy impact on the relative measure of 	 is much
larger due to the strong reallocation e¤ect, where domestic innovation expertise improves
considerably relative to foreign expertise [	 declines from 0:3672 to 0:3119, indicating a
relative deepening of domestic innovation expertise by 15:1 percent]. Lastly, in the steady-
state, aggregate private consumption growth increases marginally by 0:1 percentage points.
In terms of sensitivity analysis, a larger stepping stone e¤ect,  R2 = 15:5, brings about a
larger-than-baselinedecline in industrial ratio by 3:83 percentage points, a result consistent
with ndings in Agénor and Dinh (2013). Similar to the skills acquisition cost cut, when
the externality associated with the foreign innovation expert-innovation blueprint cross-term
(nFV;tMRt ) is specied as having positive feedback ( 
I
2 = 0:3) to imitation [instead of negative
as in the benchmark calibration], a more favourable outcome is observed for the industrial
composition ratio without the corresponding decline in share of Vertical MNCs, nFV;t.
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Foreign Investment Liberalisation Measures: The policy measures considered here
involve a permanent reduction in the doing-businesscosts for foreign experts, namely the
basic doing-business cost, F0; the additional cost incurred by foreign subsidiaries of Horizon-
tal nature, F1; and the additional cost incurred by Vertical operation with leading foreign
innovation experts, F2. The reduction of these costs may be interpreted as an outcome from
some targeted investment liberalisation measures, such as specic tax holidays, implemented
by the host economy. Recall that F0 is incurred by all types of foreign experts in the host
economy, while F1and F2 are additional costs incurred by the specic type of foreign experts.
Simulations on F2: Consider a permanent reduction of F2 from 0:40 to 0:37, which is
a three percent reduction in terms of the baseline theoretical price [equivalently, in relative
terms, a 7:5 percent drop]. While a host economy may intend to attract more foreign experts
with sophisticated know-how by reducing the additional cost incurred on them, this results
in an adverse signalling e¤ect where the proportion of foreign subsidiaries in Vertical mode
is reduced. A reduction in F2 would ceteris paribus, be expected to result in an expansion of
the perceived investment value for a typical foreign experts j with sophisticated know-how.
Nevertheless, the asymmetric productivity term, $FV , would have to adjust, as seen from
(26). The reduction in F2 puts a downward pressure on $FV [and increases the information
cost associated with perceived productivity di¤erence, 1=$FV ], and this results in a lower
and stricter threshold value for Vertical MNCs, aFV . Foreign subsidiaries are therefore less
willing to operate with experts in sophisticated know-how in the host economy, resulting in
a reduction of nFV .
Intuitively, these e¤ects may be interpreted as follows. While typical direct investment
incentives may be attractive to new rms, the reduction in F2, without an accompanying cut
in F0, can lead to an adverse signalling type of outcome. Given the duo asymmetric struc-
tures specied for the internalisation decision of a typical Vertical MNC, foreign innovation
experts would face increasing di¢ culties in discriminating the best among the most produc-
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tive ones. This productivity uncertainty associated with the asymmetric cost structure of a
typical Vertical MNC means a smaller F2 in (26), resulting in existing foreign subsidiaries
of the host economy being relatively more wary of the information cost associated with per-
ceived productivity di¤erence for a typical Vertical operation, 1=$FV [compares to 1=$FH ],
therefore preferring the alternative of bringing in an expert with standardisation know-how.
Hence, nFH increases by 4:4 percentage points while nFV drops by 0:5 percentage points.
While the decline of nFV seems to be counter-intuitive, it actually corroborates well with the
ndings in the OECD comparative study on tax holidays, which presents cases where the
elimination of such narrowed incentives did lead to long-term improvements in FDI perfor-
mance for certain developing economies (OECD 2008). Likewise, it is also consistent with
the empirical ndings documented in the various race-to-the-bottomstudies.21
The expansion in nFH further creates a secondary e¤ect: it leads to an expansion in
imitative goods relative to innovative goods due to a rise in productivity of imitation. This
results in industrial composition ratio, m, rising by 5:6 percentage points. The corresponding
increase in unskilled workers hired in imitation, U;I , given a xed number of unskilled
workers, U , means a fall in the unskilled workers employed in nal output production,
U;Y . The relative wage ratio is determined in the nal output sector, which hires both
skilled and unskilled workers. A decline in U;Y , ceteris paribus, results in an increase of the
unskilled-skilled wage ratio. This in turn disincentivizes skills acquisition and subsequently,
employment in the innovation sector. In the steady-state, this is reected as a decline in S
and S;R by 0:36 and 0:09 percentage points respectively. Nevertheless, as the decline in S;R
is much milder relative to nFV , the relative domestic innovation expertise improves, with 	
21Examples of the race-to-the-bottomstudies include Blomström (2002), Vogel and Kagan (2004), and
Olney (2013). In essense, this branch of the literature argues that the quality of the enabling environment
of investment (for examples, human capital quality), especially for foreign rms with investments in tech-
nological leadership areas, a¤ects a countrys ability to attract quality FDI more than direct investment
incentives. Indeed, it can be counterproductive to o¤er investment incentives if the fundamentalsof the
potential host economy are bad. These studies document similar adverse signalling e¤ects of narrowed FDI-
promoting policies. In the context of the analysis here, a cut in F2, without an accompanying F0 cut, is
viewed adversely by foreign subsidiaries as a signal of shortage in domestic innovation expertise and lower
productivity of domestic workers they are going to be matched to.
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declining from 0:3672 to 0:2563. This indicates a relative deepening of domestic innovation
expertise by 30:2 percent, though much of this is driven by the signicant drop of foreign
experts with sophisticated know-how in the host economy. Lastly, in the steady-state, as
imitation-based varieties remain the main intermediate type used in nal output production,
the expansion in innovative varieties raises aggregate nal output growth by 0:2 percentage
points. By implication of an increase in nal output-to-private capital ratio (Yt=Kt) and
therefore rt as in (16), aggregate private consumption grows by the same percentage points.
Other sensitivity results concerning this specic shock are summarised in Table 4, where
the adverse signalling steady-state e¤ects associated with F2 cut are consistently observed,
with the e¤ects on m being stronger the higher  R1 [greater reliance of domestic innovation
in Vertical MNCs], or the higher  R2 [greater learning associated with the stepping stone
e¤ect] is. Indeed, the simulation results are largely consistent with the Malaysian experience
over the past two decades, where the Malaysian administration had been among the most
active open-doorregime in o¤ering targeted incentives to attract foreign rms at the global
frontier, yet failed to attract many of such rms (Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009).
Simulations on F1: Next, consider a permanent reduction of F1 from 0:33 to 0:30,
equivalent to a 9:1 percent drop from the initial 0:33 in relative terms. While the steady-
state e¤ects presented in Table 4 show largely opposite results to the previous cut in F2,
the underlying operating mechanism for a reduction in F1, without an accompanying cut
in F0, is slightly di¤erent. Unlike the F2 cut, in the primary sorting channel, a direct
investment incentive in the form of a F1 cut would bring about positive e¤ects to both
nFH and nFV . As seen from (25), a reduction in F1 would bring about an increase in
$FH [or equivalently, a reduction in information cost associated with perceived productivity
di¤erence, 1=$FH ]. This in turn would result in a relaxation of the threshold value of entry
for a Horizontal mode of operation, aFH , therefore providing greater incentive for foreign
experts with standardisation know-how to come into the host economy. This is what would
36
have been expected in the previous shock if there is no asymmetry cost structure for Vertical
FDI [arising from the growing di¢ culty in identifying the best among the most productive
talents at the deeper endsof ability distribution, as aFV gets more restrictive]. In (26),
given xed F2, the reduction in F1 widens the comparative cost gap, F2   F1. In this case,
the asymmetric cost structure for Vertical MNCs brings about a positive signalling e¤ect,
therefore resulting in higher $FV [or equivalently, a reduction in 1=$FV ]. This leads to a
relaxation of the threshold value of entry for Vertical MNCs, aFV , therefore providing greater
incentives for foreign experts with sophisticated know-how to come into the host economy.
The shares of foreign innovation experts, nFV , increases, and this then results in an
expansion of the innovation sector relative to the imitation sector, hence a drop in the
industrial composition ratio, m. As the ow of innovation production increases, there is
more skilled labour hired in the innovation sector. Given initial xed supply of skilled labour,
this reallocates skilled labour away from nal output production, which then puts downward
pressure on the unskilled-skilled wage ratio, wU=wS. This creates greater incentives for skills
acquisition. In the steady-state, the shares of e¤ective skilled labour, S, and those employed
in innovation, S;R, expand by 0:38 and 0:09 percentage points respectively. Overall, the
steady-state e¤ect for the industrial composition ratio, m, is a decline of 3:33 percentage
points. In terms of the foreign-to-domestic innovation expertise ratio, 	, increases from
0:3672 to 0:4103, indicating a growing reliance on foreign experts in innovation expertise.
In terms of sensitivity analysis, it can be observed from Table 4 that the outcome of
industrial transformation tends to be more favourable when either of the four elasticity
parameters in the blueprint-production sectors examined is larger. This is notable for the
two parameters in the innovation sector ( R1 and  
R
2 ). Nevertheless, in all four cases, the
disadvantage of this specic policy shock is that it is achieved through a growing reliance
on foreign experts in innovation expertise since nFV grows at a larger magnitude than S;R.
This is especially so when there is positive feedback from the cross-term of nFV;tMRt to the
productivity of imitation ( I2 = 0:3).
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Simulations on F0: Next, consider a permanent reduction of F0 from 0:2733 to 0:2433.
This is equivalent to an 11 percent cut from its initial value. This may be interpreted as
an economy-wide liberalisation attempt aimed at reducing general administrative cost for
all foreigners in the host economy. As F0 is the basic cost involved for all foreign MNCs,
this would create incentives for all foreign rms to adopt an improved mode of operation
and bring in foreign experts with more advanced know-how. Given that nFP is treated as a
residual, this would result in an unambiguous increase for both nFH and nFV . For Vertical
MNCs, the reduction in total cost required to be paid every period (F0 + F2) means there
will be an unambiguous increase of nFV in steady-state, of 0:2 percentage points. Similarly,
for Horizontal MNCs, the reduction in total cost (F0 + F1) results in an increase of nFH by
3:8 percentage points.
The increase in both nFH and nFV leads to an expansion for both the imitation and
the innovation sector, though the latter grows more in relative terms. Specically, the
industrial composition ratio, m, declines by 1:34 percentage points in the steady-state. As
the innovation sector expands relatively faster than the imitation sector, more skilled workers
are relocated out of nal output production compared to unskilled workers reallocation
to imitation. This tends to put a downward pressure on the relative wage ratio, wU=wS
[recall that it is determined by a function of S;Y =U;Y ]. This then creates greater skills
acquisition incentives and leads to an increase in the e¤ective supply of skilled labour. In
the steady-state, these e¤ects translate to moderate expansions in S and S;R. The relatively
small increase in S;R comparing to nFV also means that the foreign-to-domestic innovation
expertise ratio, 	, increases from 0:3672 to 0:4111, indicating a growing reliance on foreign
innovation experts in the host economy.
In terms of sensitivity analyses presented in Table 4, cases with larger parameters in
the innovation sector ( R1 = 0:8 and  
R
2 = 15:5) would produce more e¤ective industrial
transformation results, underlying the importance of the strength of learning e¤ects in the
innovation sectorthe former ( R1 ) denoting the direct learning from foreign experts in Ver-
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tical mode, the latter ( R2 ) denoting the stepping stone e¤ect from imitative knowledgeto
drive industrial transformation.
Figure 1
Individual Policies
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Benchmark Initial values @ cut CR cut F0 cut F1 cut F2 cut
m 0.5836 -0.0043 -0.0325 -0.0134 -0.0333 0.0560
S S 0.2400 0.0069 0.0014 0.0003 0.0038 -0.0036
SSR 0.0446 0.0013 0.0072 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0009
C/C 0.0430 0.0003 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0022 0.0022
nFV 0.0164 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0020 0.0023 -0.0052
H 0.3672 -0.0145 -0.0553 0.0439 0.0431 -0.1109
Sensitivity Test 1 - f1R = 0. 8
m 0.5836 -0.0031 -0.0276 -0.0159 -0.0380 0.0699
S S 0.2400 0.0068 0.0015 0.0000 0.0016 -0.0016
SSR 0.0446 0.0012 0.0072 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0004
C/C 0.0430 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0018 0.0010
nFV 0.0164 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0023 -0.0051
H 0.3672 -0.0138 -0.0544 0.0373 0.0440 -0.1124
Sensitivity Test 2 - f1I = 0. 7
m 0.5836 -0.0045 -0.0326 -0.0135 -0.0334 0.0562
S S 0.2400 0.0068 0.0014 0.0002 0.0037 -0.0035
SSR 0.0446 0.0012 0.0072 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0009
C/C 0.0430 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0022 0.0021
nFV 0.0164 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0020 0.0023 -0.0052
H 0.3672 -0.0124 -0.0533 0.0455 0.0439 -0.1127
Sensitivity Test 3 - f2I = 0. 3
m 0.5836 -0.0046 -0.0330 -0.0136 -0.0336 0.0568
S S 0.2400 0.0068 0.0013 0.0002 0.0037 -0.0034
SSR 0.0446 0.0012 0.0072 0.0000 0.0009 -0.0008
C/C 0.0430 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0021 0.0020
nFV 0.0164 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0021 0.0025 -0.0053
H 0.3672 -0.0119 -0.0513 0.0466 0.0468 -0.1153
Sensitivity Test 4 - f2R = 15. 5
m 0.5836 -0.0051 -0.0383 -0.0158 -0.0391 0.0682
S S 0.2400 -0.0044 0.0015 0.0003 0.0039 -0.0038
SSR 0.0446 0.0013 0.0072 0.0001 0.0010 -0.0009
C/C 0.0430 0.0003 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0022 0.0022
nFV 0.0164 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0022 -0.0051
H 0.3672 -0.0159 -0.0576 0.0423 0.0413 -0.1095
Table 4
Individual Policies: Steady-state Effects
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
@ cut
CR cut
F 0 cut
F 1 cut
F 2 cut
5.2 Composite Policy Reform Programmes
A key goal that policymakers in developing economies often seek to achieve when imple-
menting composite reform programmes involves identifying the best combination to reap the
benets of policy complementarities. The main premise of this study is that a composite
programme delivering the best outcome of industrial transformation, overall skills expansion,
and a deepening of domestic innovation expertise, while simultaneously attaining positive
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changes in nal output and aggregate private consumption growth rates, will be the preferred
composite programme.
Consider three di¤erent composite programmes, which combine the policies of a skills
acquisition cost cut [  from 0:25 to 0:18], hiring cost cut in innovation sector [R from 0:2
to 0:0], and di¤erent combinations of the three foreign investment liberalisation measures
discussed. Specically, Composite Programme A combines both the   and R shocks with a
balanced combination of foreign cost cuts [simultaneous reduction in F0, F1, and F2 by 0:03].
Composite Programme B combines the two with a proportionate cost cutting programme
tilted towards providing investment incentives for foreign experts with know-how of techno-
logical leadership [F0 reduced by 0:01, F1 reduced by 0:03, and F2 reduced by 0:05], while
Composite Programme C combines the   and R reductions with a third proportionate cost
cutting programme tilted towards providing basic investment incentives to all foreigners [F0
reduced by 0:05, F1 reduced by 0:03, and F2 reduced by 0:01].
The results of the three composite programmes implemented in the benchmark model
are illustrated in Table 5 and Figure 2. The transition paths of the key policy variables
examined largely conform to what would have been expected when the e¤ects of the indi-
vidual policies are combined. Both the simultaneous foreign cost cutting programme and
the proportionate cost cutting programme with F0 cut by 0:05 produce positive deviation
in the share of Vertical MNC, nFV . At the same time, the human capital policies of   and
R cuts would create greater incentives for labour to not only undergo training, but also
work in the innovation sector. The increase in skilled labour supply would initially put a
downward pressure on skilled wages. However, due to the overall increase in skilled employ-
ment in both the innovation (S;R) and nal output sector (S;Y ), a secondary e¤ect would
also be at play: the expansion of innovative blueprints relative to imitative blueprints, and
conversely, the varieties of sophisticated intermediate inputs relative to basic inputs. This
shift raises the productivity of skilled labour. Nonetheless, the increase in skilled labour
supply in nal output sector would also raise marginal product of unskilled workers, which
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then raises unskilled wages. This then mitigates the initial e¤ect on incentives to acquire
skills, and the labour market adjustment dynamics are reected in the hump-shaped pattern
associated with m and 	 in Figure 2.
The decline in imitative varieties would further feed back into the foreign rmsinternali-
sation process, which creates a tertiary dynamic that is then reected in the cyclical pattern
of m and 	. The decline in imitative varieties makes the host economy less attractive as a
host to Horizontal MNCs, but at the same time improves the incentive for foreign innovation
experts with sophisticated know-how to enter. In the case of Composite Programme A, this
therefore mitigates the initial decline in nFV and results in an overall increase of nFV in
steady-state, while in the case of Composite Programme C, it further leads to growth in the
share of Vertical MNCs. Overall, while the host economy would experience improvements
in both industrial composition and relative domestic innovation expertise under both Com-
posite Programme A and Composite Programme C, the balanced Composite Programme A
would be the better programme as it sustains aggregate private consumption growth whereas
Composite Programme C would lead to a slight decline in steady-state.
In contrast, Composite Programme B results in largely opposite results. The share of
Vertical MNCs, nFV , would decline in steady-state due to the adverse signalling e¤ects
associated with the large F2 cut. This then results in reverse transformation towards
imitation, less incentive to acquire skills and work in innovation sector, hence a drop in both
S and S;R. In terms of steady-state aggregate private consumption growth, Composite
Programme B predictably delivers the largest gain of 0:22 percentage points, but unlike
the preferred Composite Programme A, this is maintained by not making much progress in
industrial transformation.
Tables 5 and 6 present additional simulation results for nine sensitivity tests. We focus
on the two key variables of industrial composition ratio (m) and foreign-domestic innovation
expertise ratio (	). When the elasticity of blueprint production with respect to foreign
experts in either the innovation ( R1 ) or imitation sector ( 
I
1) is calibrated at a higher value,
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Composite Programme C [which depends more on the inow of foreign innovation experts
to drive industrial transformation] would see a larger decline in m at the cost of a larger 	.
On the other hand, while the policy e¤ects on both indicators are milder under Composite
Programme A when foreign experts have a greater inuence on the host economys design
activities [hence taking awaysome of the e¤ectiveness of the human capital policies], the
more balanced reform program continues to have the edge over Composite Programme C for
the gains made in the deepening of domestic innovation expertise, as well as sustaining growth
rates in private consumption. Similar results are also observed when sensitivity analysis is
implemented with a positive externality specication for the parameter,  I2. In a nutshell, the
relatively balanced Composite Programme A would tend to deliver more e¤ective industrial
transformation outcomes compared to Composite Programme B, while being much better
at promoting the deepening of domestic innovation expertise when compared to Composite
Programme C. The policy experiment results are generally consistent with the consensus
views documented in Saggi (2002) and Faeth (2009), where evidence on the direct role of
FDI in promoting domestic innovation is mixed, but their indirect impacts tend to be positive
if their presence leads to a deepening of domestic innovation expertise.
Meanwhile, when the externality parameter associated with learning e¤ects in both the
innovation sector [the stepping stone e¤ect from the stock of imitative goods,  R2 ] is calibrated
at a higher value, the steady-state e¤ects on both the industrial composition ratio (m)
and foreign-domestic innovation expertise ratio (	) are unambiguously better in all three
composite programmes. As an illustration, Figure 3 presents results on the steady-state
deviations of m across di¤erent combinations of  R2 and  
I
2, and the strong e¤ects associated
with a larger stepping stone observed are consistent with Agénor and Dinh (2013) and Agénor
and Alpaslan (2014). Table 6 presents other sensitivity analysis results.
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Figure 2
Composite Programmes:
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Time
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Table 5
Composite Programmes: Steady-state Effects
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Benchmark Initial values Composite A Composite B Composite C
m 0.5836 -0.0489 -0.0048 -0.0830
SS 0.2400 0.0092 0.0067 0.0121
SSR 0.0446 0.0089 0.0082 0.0097
C/C 0.0430 0.0007 0.0022 -0.0010
nFV 0.0164 0.0007 -0.0036 0.0039
H 0.3672 -0.0477 -0.1256 0.0063
Sensitivity Test 1 - f1R = 0. 8
m 0.5836 -0.0461 0.0115 -0.0886
SS 0.2400 0.0088 0.0079 0.0107
SSR 0.0446 0.0088 0.0085 0.0093
C/C 0.0430 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0003
nFV 0.0164 0.0008 -0.0035 0.0040
H 0.3672 -0.0456 -0.1252 0.0102
Sensitivity Test 2 - f1I = 0. 7
m 0.5836 -0.0493 -0.0050 -0.0837
SS 0.2400 0.0090 0.0066 0.0066
SSR 0.0446 0.0088 0.0082 0.0096
C/C 0.0430 0.0008 0.0023 -0.0009
nFV 0.0164 0.0010 -0.0035 0.0043
H 0.3672 -0.0427 -0.1238 0.0149
Sensitivity Test 3 - f1R = 0. 8, f2I = 0. 3
m 0.5836 -0.0486 0.0116 -0.0938
SS 0.2400 0.0084 0.0079 0.0100
SSR 0.0446 0.0087 0.0085 0.0091
C/C 0.0430 0.0011 0.0014 0.0000
nFV 0.0164 0.0011 -0.0035 0.0047
H 0.3672 -0.0386 -0.1253 0.0256
Sensitivity Test 4 - f1I = 0. 7, f2I = 0. 3
m 0.5836 -0.0501 -0.0050 -0.0835
SS 0.2400 0.0088 0.0066 0.0115
SSR 0.0446 0.0088 0.0082 0.0096
C/C 0.0430 0.0009 0.0023 -0.0007
nFV 0.0164 0.0012 -0.0035 0.0046
H 0.3672 -0.0386 -0.1239 0.0199
Composite A
Composite B
Composite C
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Table 6
Composite Policy Reform Programmes: Steady-state Effects (continue)
Initial values Composite A Composite B Composite C Composite A Composite B Composite C
Sensitivity Test 4 - f1I = 0.7, f2I = 0.3 Sensitivity Test 7 - R = 0.54
m 0.5836 -0.0501 -0.0050 -0.0835 m -0.0303 -0.0066 -0.0481
S S 0.2400 0.0088 0.0066 0.0115 SS 0.0092 0.0078 0.0109
SSR 0.0446 0.0088 0.0082 0.0096 S SR 0.0095 0.0091 0.0099
C/C 0.0430 0.0009 0.0023 -0.0007 C/C 0.0004 0.0012 -0.0006
nFV 0.0164 0.0012 -0.0035 0.0046 n FV 0.0006 -0.0040 0.0042
H 0.3672 -0.0386 -0.1239 0.0199 H -0.0533 -0.1374 0.0098
Sensitivity Test 5 - f2R = 15.5 Sensitivity Test 8 - LI = 0.25
m 0.5836 -0.0571 -0.0058 -0.0955 m -0.0523 -0.0093 -0.0860
S S 0.2400 0.0096 0.0068 0.0128 SS 0.0097 0.0053 0.0137
SSR 0.0446 0.0090 0.0083 0.0099 S SR 0.0090 0.0078 0.0102
C/C 0.0430 0.0006 0.0022 -0.0012 C/C 0.0004 0.0031 -0.0021
nFV 0.0164 0.0005 -0.0037 0.0034 n FV 0.0000 -0.0023 0.0014
H 0.3672 -0.0526 -0.1268 -0.0040 H -0.0612 -0.0982 -0.0423
Sensitivity Test 6 - f1R = 0.8, f2R = 15.5 Sensitivity Test 9 - gk = 1.2
m 0.5836 -0.0541 0.0141 -0.1006 m -0.0483 -0.0083 -0.0798
S S 0.2400 0.0092 0.0080 0.0113 SS 0.0094 0.0000 0.0127
SSR 0.0446 0.0089 0.0086 0.0095 S SR 0.0090 0.0080 0.0099
C/C 0.0430 0.0007 0.0014 -0.0005 C/C 0.0005 0.0026 -0.0014
nFV 0.0164 0.0006 -0.0035 0.0035 n FV 0.0003 -0.0028 0.0025
H 0.3672 -0.0493 -0.1259 -0.0001 H -0.0557 -0.1085 -0.0200
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5.3 Endogenous Technical Change, Policy Complementarities
In addition, we consider endogenous change in the industrial production structure. As
pointed out by Agénor and Dinh (2013), as the process of industrial transformation gradually
takes place over time, the share of basic inputs in composite intermediate inputs, , is
expected to change. Nonetheless, endogenising a production parameter and linking it to a
non-linear variable using a standard S-curve within a high-dimension system could easily
pose a convergence problem. To overcome this problem, a generalised logistic curve is used
to model  endogenously to the change in the industrial composition ratio, mt, with the
critical parameter on rate of technological di¤usion gradually increased in typical fashion of
sensitivity analysis.
The generalised logistic curve is specied as
t = f(mt) = m +
(M   m)
[1 + expf (mt  mI)g]1= ; t  m; (55)
where m; M 2 (0; 1) represents the lower and upper bounds (asymptotes) of t respectively,
 is the technological di¤usion rate,  > 0 is the corresponding asymptote value for di¤usion,
and mI is the inection point for the industrial composition ratio. For the purposes of this
particular sensitivity analysis, the calibrations of m = 0:1, M = 0:9, and mI = 0:55 are
applied, all of which are reasonable values for a typical S-curve. The parameter  is set
at 1:0 to 5:0, which indicates a sensitivity analysis of di¤usion rates ranging from 100 to
500 percent, and the parameter  is calibrated to maintain initial steady-state values at
t = 0:57, mt = 0:5836, and 	t = 0:3672 for the di¤erent cases of .
The three composite policy reform programmes are examined again, with steady-state
e¤ects for the key variables of interest presented in Table 7. For all composite programmes,
endogenising t generates more sensitive results. The higher the di¤usion rate,  considered,
the greater the steady-state e¤ects documented. The additional gains amplify the policy
complementarity e¤ects. For example, at the highest  value examined ( = 5:0), Composite
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Programme A would lead t to decline from 0:57 to 0:496. This would result in an impressive
reduction of  7:8 percentage points in the industrial composition ratio (in comparison, in
the benchmark model with xed , m declines by 4:9 percentage points), and expansion of
S and S;R by 1:95 and 1:82 percentage points respectively. In terms of the deepening of
domestic innovation expertise, the foreign-domestic innovation expertise ratio, 	 decreases
more signicantly too despite both S;R and nFV having increased. At the same time, the
steady-state e¤ect on aggregate private consumption growth would be higher too, growing
by 0:21 percentage points. The nal output growth rate increases from 4:3 to 4:5 percentage
points. These indicate across-the-boardgains, underlying the signicance of endogenous
technological change in magnifying the benets of policy complementarity between human
capital and FDI-promoting policies. These greater benets of policy complementarity are
summarised in Table 8.
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Table 7
Sensitivity Analysis: Endogenous X with Generalised Logistic Curve
Composite Programmes: (Absolute deviations from initial steady-state)
Initial values Composite A Composite B Composite C
100% diffusion rate, Q = 1.0
m 0.5836 -0.0535 -0.0054 -0.0902
SS 0.2400 0.0105 0.0068 0.0143
SSR 0.0446 0.0101 0.0083 0.0118
C/C 0.0430 0.0009 0.0022 -0.0007
H 0.3672 -0.0566 -0.1262 -0.0112
X 0.5700 -0.0097 -0.0010 -0.0164
200% diffusion rate, Q = 2.0
m 0.5836 -0.0585 -0.0060 -0.0978
SS 0.2400 0.0121 0.0070 0.0169
SSR 0.0446 0.0116 0.0085 0.0142
C/C 0.0430 0.0011 0.0022 -0.0003
H 0.3672 -0.0670 -0.1271 -0.0310
X 0.5700 -0.0215 -0.0021 -0.0361
300% diffusion rate, Q = 3.0
m 0.5836 -0.0643 -0.0067 -0.1059
SS 0.2400 0.0141 0.0072 0.0200
SSR 0.0446 0.0134 0.0086 0.0171
C/C 0.0430 0.0013 0.0023 0.0002
H 0.3672 -0.0791 -0.1280 -0.0528
X 0.5700 -0.0358 -0.0035 -0.0592
400% diffusion rate, Q = 4.0
m 0.5836 -0.0709 -0.0076 -0.1141
SS 0.2400 0.0165 0.0075 0.0238
SSR 0.0446 0.0155 0.0089 0.0205
C/C 0.0430 0.0017 0.0023 0.0008
H 0.3672 -0.0931 -0.1294 -0.0764
X 0.5700 -0.0532 -0.0055 -0.0859
500% diffusion rate, Q = 5.0
m 0.5836 -0.0780 -0.0087 -0.1217
SS 0.2400 0.0195 0.0078 0.0280
SSR 0.0446 0.0182 0.0092 0.0243
C/C 0.0430 0.0021 0.0023 0.0015
H 0.3672 -0.1090 -0.1309 -0.1010
X 0.5700 -0.0739 -0.0080 -0.1153
Table 8
Policy Complementarities - Composite Programme A
(Absolute deviations)
m S S SSR C/C H
Sum of Parts:
@cut -0.0043 0.0069 0.0013 0.0003 -0.0145
CR cut -0.0325 0.0014 0.0072 0.0009 -0.0553
F0 cut -0.0134 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0439
F1 cut -0.0333 0.0038 0.0009 -0.0022 0.0431
F2 cut 0.0560 -0.0036 -0.0009 0.0022 -0.1109
Aggregate effects -0.0275 0.0087 0.0086 0.0011 -0.0937
Composite A (fixedX) -0.0489 0.0092 0.0089 0.0007 -0.0477
Composite A (endogenous X)
- Q = 1.0 -0.0535 0.0105 0.0101 0.0009 -0.0566
- Q = 2.0 -0.0585 0.0121 0.0116 0.0011 -0.0670
- Q = 3.0 -0.0643 0.0141 0.0134 0.0013 -0.0791
- Q = 4.0 -0.0709 0.0165 0.0155 0.0017 -0.0931
- Q = 5.0 -0.0780 0.0195 0.0182 0.0021 -0.1090
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops an imitation-innovation model with heterogeneous labour and foreign
MNCs to examine industrial transformation for a developing host economy. With FDI
modelled at the disaggregated level of foreign experts, we formalise a MNC composition-
determination framework that explains Dunnings internalisation advantage(1977) as being
driven by the presence of asymmetric views on productivity of domestic workers. As produc-
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tivity is a transformation of ability, the skills acquisition decision and foreign subsidiaries
operational mode choice are determined along the same ability distribution in the model.
This, coupled with the modelling of an additional asymmetry between Vertical MNCs and
other MNCs, enable the model to be calibrated and analysed. The calibrated analysis pro-
duces policy experiment results that are consistent with some well-documented stylised facts
in the FDI literature.
We examine the transitional dynamics of various policies. The results showed that the
implementation of foreign investment liberalisation measures in a typical developing host
economy would not be a matter of straightforward provision of investment incentives. Indeed,
in the presence of asymmetries, our results nd that an investment liberalisation measure that
is balanced and targeting all types of foreign rms is more innovation- and skills acquisition-
promoting than disproportionate ones biased towards selected types of foreign rms. Overall,
the results showed the importance of combining human capital and FDI-promoting policies in
promoting industrial transformation, especially if the government of a host economy intends
to minimise disruption of industrial transformation. Furthermore, results from the sensitivity
analysis conducted with endogenous technological change support the conventional belief
that governments of developing economies should strive to undertake measures in improving
the technological di¤usion rate within the economy.
There remain limitations that future research can address. For this reasonably com-
plicated high-dimensional model, some policy elements are not pursued, largely as a self-
contained measure to ease computational burden, but are obviously aspects for extensions.
For instance, the role of scal policy in the model is minimal. Second, while the model
establishes indirect feedback from the skills channel to FDI composition, a direct feedback
channel of human capital to FDI is not modelled. For future research, notably in a model
with Lucas type of disembodied human capital and more traditional modelling of FDI as
capital, this would obviously be worth examining.
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